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 Foreword
by Tamás molnár*
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre of Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies 
and the Corvinus University of Budapest, Faculty of Social Sciences and International 
Relations, Institute of International Studies co-organised a one day international workshop 
entitled “The Autonomy of EU Law from the Perspective of International Judicial Bodies: 
A Mixed Blessing?” on 1 October 2015 in Budapest, which took place in the premises of 
the Institute for Legal Studies.
The workshop was essentially inspired by the little academic attention that the concept 
of the autonomy of EU law has received since its inception in the 1960s when compared to 
other basic EU law premises such as “primacy” or “direct effect”, particularly from the 
theoretical or conceptual angle. However, “autonomy” is undisputedly a fundamental and 
structural principle of the EU legal order since its judge-made creation. In essence, the 
concept of autonomy oversteps the traditional divide between international law and 
domestic law by giving birth to a new category of law, a “new legal order”. Given the 
reflexive nature of the term “autonomy”, that is, to be distinct from something and to be 
able to function separately, it presupposes one or more points of reference. If these points of 
reference assume the form of legal orders, the autonomy of EU law can be basically 
conceived in two ways: vis-à-vis either international law or the domestic legal systems of 
Member States. The concept of autonomy is traditionally perceived in the context of 
international law (external dimension of autonomy) as the famous judgments of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Van Gend en Loos, Costa v. E.N.E.L. and 
many of its Opinions have further developed this doctrine. The CJEU pronounced that the 
“Community constitutes a new legal order” and that EU law arose out of an “independent 
source of law”. The external dimension of autonomy of EU law applies in relation to third 
States and international organisations and the whole body of general international law as 
such. Surely, this purely conceptual notion as it has been elaborated by the CJEU and 
cannot exist in total isolation from social reality in which it must be embedded and 
concretised. This claimed autonomy of EU law was not only emphasised and advocated by 
scholars of EU law, but many international lawyers have also examined its specific, 
autonomous character, whether or not it qualifies as a “self-contained regime”.
It is particularly interesting to see how external actors on the international plane, 
notably international judicial bodies have seen and considered the need of European Union 
law for structural separation and normative autonomy from international law. The organizers 
of the conference, Gábor Sulyok (Institute for Legal Studies) and Tamás Molnár (Corvinus 
University of Budapest) believed that examining the case-law of different international 
courts and tribunals can facilitate the better understanding of the external normative 
implications of the claimed autonomous character of EU law. While some international 
judicial bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights, consistently treat it as a 
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separate legal order, the practice of arbitration tribunals seems much more complex, with 
positions changing from one ad hoc tribunal to another. These divergences are well 
illustrated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s “Iron Rhine Arbitration”, which 
recognized the EU’s special judicial system and by a decision of a panel of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Electrabel v. Hungary, which 
plainly qualified EU law as part and parcel of international law.
This backdrop raises several questions: How much this self-perceived autonomy of the 
EU legal order is shared and accepted by different international courts and tribunals? How 
do international judges and arbitrators treat this structural principle of EU law after more 
than 50 years of its emergence? What is the relevance of the controversial position of these 
international judicial bodies at a time when the EU engages in more and more interactions 
with international law? The workshop sought to frame intellectual avenues to clarify and 
understand these issues as well as to formulate answers to the above questions. 
The programme of the workshop was divided into two main panels. The first, chaired 
by Balázs Horváthy (Institute for Legal Studies), revisited the theoretical foundations of the 
autonomy of EU law, with presentations exploring the genuine or functional nature of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order by Márton Varjú (Lendület HPOPs Research Group of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences), and then reconsidering the theoretical foundations of the 
autonomy doctrine by Ramses Wessel (University of Twente). After discussing the 
conceptual framework, the second panel, moderated by Tamás Molnár, was focusing on 
judicial practice and provided a “reality check” on how the EU as an entity appears in 
international investment arbitration proceedings and how international arbitration tribunals 
actually treat EU law as an autonomous legal order. Presentations were held about the 
qualification of arbitral awards as state aid under EU law by Tamás Kende (Eötvös Loránd 
University of Budapest); investor-State (EU) arbitration after the Lisbon Treaty and the 
modalities of allocating financial responsibility between the EU and its Member States by 
Federica Cristiani (Institute for Legal Studies) as well as the award rendered by the ICSID 
in the case Micula and others v. Romania was commented by Mónika Papp (Eötvös Loránd 
University of Budapest), which illustrates nicely the clashes between EU state aid law and 
international arbitration .
